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1. The main strand of Aberdein’s paper, though perhaps not the only one, is an 
argument in favor of the viability of a virtue-based theory of fallacies. This theory 
claims chiefly that arguments can and should be appraised as fallacious, namely as 
committing some fallacy, if and insofar as arguers have a disposition to engage in 
various cognitive vices, namely a disposition to violate or fail to practice various 
cognitive virtues. Aberdein’s argument amounts to defending this claim from a key 
objection and supporting it with at least two reasons. 
The key objection stems from a common view about ad hominem arguments; 
that is, the view that it is illegitimate to criticize an argument on the basis of the 
circumstances or character of the arguer; indeed to do so is, allegedly, to commit the 
so-called ad hominem fallacy. Thus, or so the criticism goes, the virtue theory of 
fallacies is itself advocating committing the ad hominem fallacy in the appraisal of 
argumentation. 
One of Aberdein’s supporting reasons is relatively specific and concrete; it 
involves an analysis of several examples designed to show that it is sometimes 
legitimate and proper to criticize arguments based on the cognitive circumstances 
or intellectual character of arguers. His more general and programmatic reason is a 
sketch of how the eighteen alleged fallacies which John Woods (2004, pp. 4-5; 2013, 
chapter 1.2) has labeled the “gang of eighteen” could be analyzed as, or at least 
correlated with, various cognitive vices, i.e., as violations or failures of cognitive 
virtues. 
Part of what I want to do in this commentary is to construe Aberdein’s paper 
as an argument. This is an interpretive task which I have just fulfilled with the 
reconstruction I have just sketched. Of course, in so doing I have made more explicit 
what is already implicit in his essay. But I am also implicitly pursuing my own 
agenda in logical theory, which is partly to emphasize, more than is usually done, 
interpretive issues, as distinct from evaluative ones (cf. Finocchiaro, 2005, pp. 14-
15). Another part is to stress interpretation also at the meta-level, namely when the 
argumentation in question is about arguments, which may be labeled meta-
argumentation (cf. Finocchiaro, 2013b). This is obviously the case in the present 
context, where Aberdein’s argument is clearly a meta-argument. From this point of 
view, the reconstructed summary I have just given is merely the tip of an analytical 
iceberg, which is full of interesting complexities, and whose careful examination 
could easily take up the rest of this session. 
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However, I also would like to appraise or evaluate Aberdein’s argument. 
Ideally, this should be done not only on the basis of various principles which I find 
plausible or are generally acceptable (“external” evaluation, so to speak), but also on 
the basis of the various vices and virtues elaborated in his own account (“internal” 
evaluation, so to speak). Moreover, it would also be desirable to conduct both the 
external and the internal evaluations from a positive as well as negative point of 
view, or at least to keep open the possibility that the commentator may end up 
strengthening the object argument, and not necessarily refuting or weakening it. 
Such a balanced evaluation would be especially important, given that the myriad 
virtues and vices in Aberdein’s typology would tend to encourage an internal 
evaluation that might easily turn into a nit-picking exercise.1 
 
2. Let us begin our evaluation by focusing on the key objection to the virtue theory 
of argument, charging that it commits the ad hominem fallacy. Some of what 
Aberdein says in its defense makes it sound as if he were countercharging that, in so 
charging, the critics are committing a fallacy of equivocation. This is the impression 
conveyed by remarks such as the following: “In Section 2, I will show that this 
criticism of virtue argumentation unsuccessfully trades on an ambiguity in the 
definition of ad hominem” (sect. 1); and “once the ambiguity in the presentation of 
the ad hominem is resolved, the theory is able to withstand the argument that it is 
inherently fallacious” (sect. 6). I don’t think that such countercharge is accurate or 
fair, but I mention this possibility because if the counterchange were correct, it 
                                                 
1 For example, consider Aberdein’s definition of ad hominem0 as “arguing from the respondent’s 
commitments” (sect. 2). Now, Aberdein does admit that his list of five subtypes of ad hominem 
arguments is “neither exhaustive nor exclusive” (sect. 2), and that “ad hominem0 is never 
argumentationally vicious as such” (sect. 4); still, one could point out that his definition of ad 
hominem0 is incomplete and misses the main part. In fact, it should be expanded to read “arguing 
from the respondent’s commitments to derive a conclusion not acceptable or nor previously 
accepted by him/her,” for this is the main point in this type of argumentation (cf. Johnstone, 1959; 
Finocchiaro, 1974, 2001). Then one could search in Aberdein’s Table 2 (sect. 1) to find some virtue(s) 
which he might be violating with this definition; possible candidates might be “insight into theories” 
(2aiii), “sensitivity to detail” (2di), or “care” (4cii). Next, one would examine Aberdein’s Table 3 (sect. 
5) to try to correlate such violation(s) with one or more fallacies. Similar issues would arise if we 
consider Aberdein’s treatment of “composition and division” as if it were a single fallacy beset by 
“inattention to detail, (2) (d) (i)” (sect. 5); however, composition and division refer to two argument 
types that are basically the reverse of one another, and so the question would arise whether his 
treatment embodies this very vice; and since here Aberdein may be adapting the gang-of-eighteen 
list from others, there might also arise the question of what he (sect. 1) calls “fairness in evaluating 
the arguments of others” (2bii) and “open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence” (2biii). 
Finally, consider Aberdein’s remark that “although the fallacies are stigmatized in textbooks as 
invariably bad, they are better understood as sometimes legitimate and sometimes not” (sect. 5); 
taken literally, this claim is self-contradictory, since it says in part that fallacies are sometimes 
legitimate, i.e., that illegitimate arguments are sometimes legitimate; thus, there certainly ought to be 
some virtue which is being violated and some vice which is being exemplified, although it is hard to 
find it in Aberdein’s Table 2; however, it is obvious that what he really means is that “although the 
alleged fallacies are stigmatized …,” or to express it in a more round-about manner, “although the 
argument types which textbooks call fallacies are stigmatized as invariably bad, those arguments are 
better understood as sometimes legitimate and sometimes not”; and so formulated, this claim is both 
right and important. 
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would exemplify a beautiful sequence of argument, counterargument, and meta-
argument. That is, from an interpretive point of view, here we would have a very 
interesting, and almost awe-inspiring, phenomenon. 
However, Aberdein seems to be correct that the critics fail to distinguish and 
interrelate sufficiently clearly and explicitly the various conceptions of ad hominem. 
He himself discusses five different meanings, the principal ones of which are the 
following: “ad hominem3: arguing that the respondent’s character rebuts his 
argument; ad hominem4: arguing that the respondent’s character undercuts his 
argument” (sect. 2). Here, Aberdein is adapting the terminology of John Pollock 
(1992), for whom to “rebut” an argument apparently means to refute its conclusion 
or prove a contrary claim, and to “undercut” an argument apparently means to show 
that the presupposed link between premise and conclusion does not hold, i.e., that 
the premise (whether true or false) does not really provide support for the 
conclusion. 
There is another strand in Aberdein’s reply to the ad hominem charge. He 
points out that such critics claim that whereas ad hominem3 can be legitimate, ad 
hominem4 never is, and in the process they assume uncritically that “it is commonly 
supposed that it is never reasonable to reject an argument on the basis of such facts” 
about the arguer (quoted in sect. 2, from Bowell & Kingsbury, 2013, p. 26). However, 
Aberdein reports the views of several scholars, showing not only that there is 
general agreement that ad hominem3 is sometimes correct, but also that “contrary 
to [the critics], it is not ‘commonly supposed’ that ad hominem4 arguments are 
always fallacious” (sect. 2). 
The most interesting and important of these views is that of John Woods, 
who not only distinguishes between ad hominem3 and ad hominem4, but also 
interrelates them by grounding ad hominem3 on ad hominem4. Woods’s account is 
quoted by Aberdein and is worth repeating: “(1) Sarah makes her ad hominem 
retort. (2) She concludes from this that the adequacy of her opponent’s case is called 
into doubt. (3) She concludes from this that there is reason to think that her 
interlocutor’s position is false” (quoted sect. 2, from Woods, 2007, p. 124). Here, 
Aberdein’s interpretation of this plausibly construes Woods’s term “case” as 
“argument,” and his term “position” as “conclusion.” 
 
3. Aberdein also replies to the ad hominem criticism by trying to show that the 
critics’ key claim is false, namely that it is false that hominem4 arguments are always 
fallacious; or positively expressed, that ad hominem4 arguments are sometimes 
legitimate. This positive claim can also be viewed as a reason constructively 
supporting the virtue theory. Aberdein discusses several examples to support this 
claim. 
Two of his examples involve simple arguments whose deductive validity or 
invalidity depends in an obvious manner on the meaning of the premises; these 
meanings depend in turn on various circumstances in which the arguers find 
themselves, in such a way that the meaning of some key term is ambiguous and 
shifts in the course of the argument, thus generating fallacies of equivocation. These 
are presumably cases where even the deductive evaluation of an argument properly 
depends on the circumstances of the arguer. 
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Another group of cases involves heuristic nondeductive reasoning by 
mathematicians, in which they reach conclusions about the likelihood that the proof 
of a new mathematical result is correct. Sometimes they base their tentative 
conclusion on the behavior of the mathematician involved, considering such things 
as whether he fails to build upon previous work, and whether he wastes much space 
on standard material (sect. 3). 
And a third example briefly mentioned by Aberdein involves arguments by 
proponents of intelligent design. Many such arguments can be accurately 
interpreted as inferences to the best explanation, in which complex features of the 
natural world are claimed to be inexplicable on evolutionary grounds but explicable 
by intelligent design. However, as Aberdein plausibly points out, many such 
arguments can also be fairly criticized insofar as their proponents tend to “ignore 
relevant work showing how complex features of organisms can be the product of 
natural selection; [and] dogmatically insist on their own preferred explanation” 
(sect. 3). 
As long as we do not exaggerate the import of the conclusion here, I believe 
this is a cogent argument rendering it plausible that arguments can sometimes be 
criticized on the basis of the intellectual character of the arguer, in the sense that the 
link between premise and conclusion can be regarded as weakened by the presence 
of various vices. In fact, here I would like to strengthen Aberdein’s claim by briefly 
discussing a classic historical example. 
 
4. The example comes from an argument which Galileo advanced on more than one 
occasion in the context of the Copernican controversy in the seventeenth century. 
He liked to point out all Copernicans had previously been Ptolemaics, but no 
Ptolemaics had previously been Copernicans; moreover, the Copernicans knew the 
pro-Ptolemaic arguments, but the Ptolemaics did not know the pro-Copernican 
arguments. That is, the Copernicans were open-minded but the Ptolemaics were not, 
or at least the Copernicans were more open-minded than the Ptolemaics. And from 
this difference Galileo explicitly drew the conclusion that the Copernican arguments 
were better than the Ptolemaic ones, and hence that Copernicanism was more likely 
to be true than geocentrism (Galilei, 2008, pp. 148-52, 217-18; cf. Galilei, 1997, p. 
149 n. 74; Finocchiaro, 2005, pp. 98-100). 
Note the cautious and judicious formulation of Galileo’s meta-conclusion. He 
is not claiming that the Ptolemaic arguments are worthless because their 
proponents are closed-minded, nor that the Copernican arguments are conclusive 
because the Copernican arguers are open-minded. Instead he is saying that the 
closed-mindedness of the Ptolemaics is a clue to the weakness of their arguments, 
and that the open-mindedness of the Copernicans is a clue to the strength of their 
arguments. Moreover, Galileo does not pretend that this is the end of the story. 
Rather he realizes that this is just one argument among many; that the particular 
Ptolemaic arguments have to be concretely criticized on their own merits; and that 
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5. Finally, we come to what I called earlier Aberdeen’s general and programmatic 
argument for a virtue theory of fallacies, consisting of a sketch of the connection 
between Woods’s gang of eighteen and various cognitive vices. And here my attitude 
is more critical, but unfortunately time and space limitation will force me to be even 
more sketchy in my criticism than Aberdein is in his exposition.  
So far I have agreed that Aberdein cogently defends his account from the 
objection that it commits the ad hominem fallacy (although his defense does not 
possess the elegance it would possess if it amounted to the countercharge that the 
objection commits the fallacy of equivocation). And I have also agreed that his 
inductive generalization for the propriety of ad hominem4 is cogent and 
independently confirmable to some extent (although only to the extent of claiming 
that such ad hominem4 undercutting merely weakens, but does not completely 
destroy, the inferential correctness of the criticized argument). However, with 
regard to the prospects for a general virtue-based theory of fallacies, I see some 
serious obstacles. 
The essential difficulty stems from the concept of fallacy. By fallacy is meant 
a common type of argument that appears to be correct but in fact is not (cf. Whately, 
1826, p. 131; Hamblin, 1970, pp. 224-25, 253-54; Finocchiaro, 1981, pp. 110-16; 
Woods, 2012, p. 514; Woods, 2013, chapter 4.6; Finocchiaro, 2013a, sect. 1). There 
are five elements in this conception: the fallacy must be (1) an argument, not a mere 
claim; (2) the argument must belong to some more or less identifiable kind or type; 
(3) the type must be common, in the sense of having frequently occurring instances; 
(4) the argument must have the appearance of being correct; but (5) it must be 
inferentially incorrect. Thus, to show that a given argument is a fallacy (“fallacious” 
in the sense of committing some fallacy), it is clearly not enough to show that it is 
inferentially incorrect, since there are three other conditions that must be fulfilled, 
namely generality of kind, frequency of occurrence, and apparent correctness. 
However, the account of fallacies adumbrated by Aberdein deals with only two of 
these things, argumentation and inferential incorrectness. This is at best a theory of 
argument appraisal, not a theory of fallacies. 
And there is a second limitation, I believe. The negative appraisal of the 
argument generated by the cognitive vices of the arguer is a relatively weak kind of 
criticism; usually, one would want to supplement it with other more robust, more 
internal, and more concrete kinds of criticism addressing the details of the content 
and structure of the propositions involved. It is certainly important to understand 
that criticism of the argument based on the cognitive vices of the arguer is not 
irrelevant, but can be informative and effective to some extent; and as I said before, 
Aberdein may be said to have shown that much. However, such ad hominem4 
criticism is no substitute for the more traditional, non-agent-based kinds of 
criticism. 
 
6. However, to end on a more positive note, I would say that it is also important to 
realize that, besides the traditional non-agent-based criticism of arguments, there 
exists another kind which is based on good or bad dispositions of the arguers. In 
fact, such ad hominem3 or ad hominem4 criticism corresponds to (although it is not 
identical with) what many call methodological criticism, namely criticism based on 
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methodological principles and practices. I am referring to such critiques as Albert 
Einstein’s criticism of any physical theory that postulates a privileged inertial 
system (Einstein, 1953; cf. Finocchiaro, 1980, pp. 67-68, 97), Karl Popper’s criticism 
of Marxist social science (Popper, 1963; cf. Finocchiaro, 1979), Stephen Toulmin’s 
criticism of formal deductive logic (Toulmin, 1958; cf. Finocchiaro, 2013b, pp. 7-17), 
and, to come to less sublime and more pedestrian cases, my own criticism of the 
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